Competence, Capacity, and Surrogate Decision-Making
by Robert D. Orr
Generally speaking, patients should make their own treatment
decisions based on their understanding of the facts, the recommendations of
their physicians, and their own personal values which likely are influenced
by their cultural and religious beliefs. But what happens when an
individual's ability to understand information or to make decisions becomes
impaired? Who decides what medical interventions should and should not be
employed? And how does that surrogate decision-maker know what the patient
would want?
Competence and Capacity
We often use the terms "competence" and "capacity" (short for
"decision-making capacity") interchangeably. However, they are not exactly
the same. Competence is a legal term. Competence is presumed unless a court
has determined that an individual is incompetent. A judicial declaration of
incompetence may be global, or it may be limited (e.g., to financial matters,
personal care, or medical decisions).
Decision-making capacity, on the other hand, is a clinical term that is
task-specific. A physician may determine that a patient does not have the
capacity to make a decision for or against surgery for a hip fracture, but
she may have the capacity to decide if she wants a sleeping pill or a
laxative.
How does a physician make a determination of capacity? We say, only half
facetiously, that a generation ago a patient had capacity if he agreed with
the doctor and lacked capacity if he disagreed. Today we recognize that this
"standard" was incorrect. But we also recognize that there is no easy test to
determine capacity.
In order to make valid treatment decisions, a person must be able to (a)
recognize there is a decision to be made, (b) understand the needed
information, ©) understand the treatment options, (d) understand the likely
consequences of each option (i.e. risks, burdens, and benefits), and (e)
rationally manipulate the information to come up with a decision consistent
with his or her values.
Surrogate Decision-Making
How do we make treatment decisions for a person who has lost
capacity either permanently (e.g., from dementia, stroke, head injury) or
temporarily (e.g., from acute illness or injury)? In some instances our goal
should be to restore their decision-making capacity. When we are unable to do
so, or unable to do it quickly enough to make critical decisions, we must
rely on a surrogate. Proxy decision-making raises ethical issues
Traditionally, we have relied on the "next of kin" to make surrogate
treatment decisions. This ambiguous designation has allowed health care
professionals some latitude in choosing between a spouse, adult children,
siblings, companions, etc. In the last 10-12 years, over 35 states have
eliminated this latitude by passing surrogate decision-making laws, which set
up a rigid hierarchy of who should be the designated relative to act as
surrogate if a patient has not left written instructions. This can often be
very helpful when there is disagreement between family members. However, it
may not always be helpful because appropriate surrogacy is not automatically
established by biologic or legal relationship. The appropriate surrogate is
one who knows the patient and knows her abilities, wishes, and values.
Once a surrogate is chosen, either by statute or by tradition, what standard
does he or she use in making treatment decisions for the patient who has lost
the capacity to do so?
Standards for Surrogate Decision-Making
When possible, a surrogate should make a treatment decision
using what is called "substituted judgment." That is, they should make the
decision the patient would make if he or she were able. This is the ethically
correct thing to do; we should not do something to a patient that he would
not want to have done. In addition, this process often relieves the surrogate
of the perception that she is making a life or death decision. It is really
the patient who is making the decision; the surrogate is merely speaking on
his behalf.
How do we know what the patient would want? Sometimes a patient has left
written instructions in an advance directive (see below). If not, perhaps she
has said to her loved ones what she would want or not want in specific
circumstances, or what values are important to her. However, we must
cautiously consider the context of such statements; some comments have more
moral significance than others. Absent a written advance directive or a
meaningful conversation, perhaps those who know the patient best have some
understanding of his values and can judge what she would find acceptable in a
given situation.
When it is impossible to make a "substituted judgment" because there is no
surrogate or no knowledge of wishes or values, we drop to the lower "best
interests" standard. While this may sound like "just do whatever you think is
right," it is not quite that simple. In fact, it is not simple at all. A best
interest treatment decision is a difficult attempt to define "what would most
people choose in this situation," and it should often involve second or third
opinions, and perhaps an ethics consultation as well, in an effort to balance
potential benefits and burdens while assessing the patient's current and
future quality of life.
Making decisions regarding medical treatment is often difficult, and such is
especially true when the patient's ability to weigh in on such matters is
questionable or even impossible. In such cases, we must carefully seek to
assess the patient's competence and decision-making capacity and, if
necessary, empower a suitable surrogate to act on his or her behalf. Though
not ideal, hopefully the treatment administered will be as compatible as
possible with what the patient would have chosen, had he or she been able to
articulate his or her desires. CBHD
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Copyright 2004 by The Center for Bioethics and Human
Dignity
The contents of this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
CBHD, its staff, board or supporters. Permission to reprint granted as long as The Center for Bioethics and
Human Dignity and the web address for this article is referenced.
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