William P. Cheshire, Jr., MD, Consultant on Neuroethics, The
Center for Bioethics & Human Dignity, Associate Professor of
Neurology at the Mayo Clinic College of Medicine, and
Consultant in Neurology at Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville,
Florida.
A primary task of ethics
is to recognize valid distinctions in the face of uncertainty concerning moral
obligations. When wrestling with lifes toughest questions, facts are often
incompletely accessible or their interpretations ambiguous. Available
theoretical approaches often yield conflicting solutions. When confronted with
healthcare dilemmas, in particular, people differ in how they prioritize and
apply their personal values to reach decisions that entail life-altering
consequences.
These are the grey
matters of bioethics. Their blurry contours outline what is known, what can
be done, and what should be done. Somewhere between bright evidence and
unfathomable unknown, between lucid right and shadowy wrong, between
decisive resolve and oblivious apathy, lies a vast expanse of ethical grey.
Bioethical greyness is
anything but dull. Things unelucidated challenge the mind to explore and
wonder. Matters undecided invite heartfelt reflection, abstract reasoning,
serious discussion and debate. Greyness allows openness to creative
interaction.
Nor is greyness
absolutely impenetrable. For those who dwell amidst ethical grey, greyness
teaches the worth of clarity, which must be patiently sought. Greyness is an
ever-present reminder of human finitude. Its ambiguity inhibits our fixation
on things that are fading and of no lasting consequence. Its indefiniteness
suggests that what most strongly motivates us may not be what is immediately
visible. The lack of clarity along greys continuum compels the restless
mind to seek what lies beyond. How life is lived depends on what grey
dwellers make of shades of grey. Grey matters.
It is, of course, grey
matter that bioethicists bring to bear on these grey matters. The grey
matter refers to that part of the brain, which, if sliced open, appears
greyin contrast to myelinated white matterand consists of the cerebral
cortex as well as the subcortical nuclei such as the hippocampus, thalamus,
and basal ganglia. In general, cerebral grey matter is that part of the
brain responsible for information processing, whereas white matter, which
connects regions of grey matter, is responsible for information
transmission. Grey matter thus has connotations both anatomical and
philosophical.
Neuroethics is the realm where cerebral and ethical grey matters
interpenetrate. The discipline of neuroethics considers the ethical
implications of advances in the neurosciences, drawing from the fields of
clinical neurology, neuropsychiatry, neuropsychology, neuroimaging,
neuropharmacology, neurogenetics, neuropathology, nanomedicine, and
computer science. The neurosciences are yielding exciting capabilities to
measure healthy and disordered brain function, to detect and alter the
course of brain diseases, as well as to understand the nature of the neural
processes that correspond to the human mind. The potential health benefits
of neuroscience are enormous. The implications for ethics are profound, for
the object of neuroscientific study is the very organ that engages in
ethical contemplation.
As neuroscience probes
the intricate structure and cellular behavior of grey matter, the
scientifically informed brain is challenged in new ways to comprehend its
own nature, its origin, its purpose, and its relationship to others. Not
only are bodily perception and movement subject to scientific investigation,
but with the advent of functional imaging techniques and less invasive
methods of stimulating the brain, neuroscience is able to offer increasingly
sophisticated descriptions of the neural basis of higher cognitive
functions. These include aspects of moral reasoning, intention,
consciousness, empathy, belief, and spiritual experience. Functional imaging
studies of higher cognitive functions are identifying and mapping
configurations of grey matter activation that correspond to thoughts that
previously were the exclusive domain of private reflection or which occur
beneath the threshold of conscious awareness.
The neural pathways
that subserve moral judgments and ethical reasoning are coming into
scientific view in unprecedented detail. Their interpretation falls to grey
matter. How society assigns meaning to the brain phenomena that correspond
to social interactions, personal beliefs, moral conscience, philosophical
analysis, as well as the drive to conduct scientific research has intriguing
implications for human self-understanding and its translation into culture.
Consider the
far-reaching implications of neuroscience for ethical decision-making. Do
subjective judgments carry moral weight if they can be shown to arise from
brain states describable in physical terms? Might physical models of the
brain invalidate the wisdom of moral repugnance?[2] Should what has been
called the yuk factor,[2] be understood simply as a conditioned neurochemical
reflex? Are reason and logic reducible also to cerebral biochemistry? Can
physical models of the brain succeed in explaining away religious belief?
How might human thought be a given reality, and how might itand
ethicsbecome subject to reshaping?
Neuroethics also has
subtle implications for the character of human interaction. What boundaries
should be respected in order that innovative freedoms of communication do
not excessively intrude into personal privacy? As powerful new computers
augment their performance by more closely imitating the brain, and become
more user-friendly by mimicking the outward expression of human emotions,
shall we in turn find ourselves imitating our computers in a quest for
maximum efficiency? What is it about human language that transcends sheer
information transmission?
Further questions for
neuroethics concern the proper place and limits of medical models of human
thought and behavior. Should drugs be used to enhance cognition in normal
individuals? When is it appropriate to manage social misbehavior with
psychotropic medications? Would it be wise to edit away unpleasant memories
if that were possible?
Neuroethics also has
implications for the integrity of personal responsibility. Can neuroscience
demonstrate whether mental agency is determined or free? What should be the
role of neuroscientific evidence in ascertaining legal responsibility for
crimes?
Many will recall
Agatha Christies fictional detective, Hercule Poirot, who brilliantly
solved crimes by use of what he called his little grey cells.[3] Poirots
success notwithstanding, contemporary neuroscience recognizes that
intelligence is also a matter of how well the grey regions of the brain
intercommunicate. Whereas grey matters, grey is not all that matters.
Likewise, neuroscience
matters, but it should be remembered that physical descriptions cannot
supply a complete explanation of the human mind. A nuanced view of
neuroethics recognizes that, between the lines of black and white data that
neuroscience generates lie shades of meaning irreducible to material
mechanisms. Great thoughts do not consist in clusters of reflexively firing
neurons, although neurons may represent them. Amazingly, it is neurons that
give expression to the human longings that inspire moral imagination. Such
aspirations brightly overshadow the greyest grey.
As we
welcome progress in neuroscience, let us conscientiously explore the
fullness of neuroethics. The journey into neuroethics will not have been
exhausted when the hairs of generations to come have turned grey.CBHD
References
1. Kass, Leon R. The Wisdom of Repugnance. New Republic
Vol. 216 Issue 22 (June 2, 1997).
2. Morton, Oliver. Overcoming Yuk. Wired, January 6, 1998.
3. Christie, Agatha. The Mysterious Affair at Styles. London: Bodley
Head, 1920, Chapter 10.
Copyright 2006 by The Center for Bioethics and Human
Dignity
The contents of this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
CBHD, its staff, board or supporters. Permission to reprint granted as long as The Center for Bioethics and
Human Dignity and the web address for this article is referenced.
This article originally appeared in Ethics &
Medicine: An International Journal of Bioethics 22.1