Some philosophers have argued that ‘human dignity’ is a useless concept in bioethics, on the grounds that those who employ the term typically use it as a stand-in for ‘autonomy’ or ‘sanctity of life’. Against such critics, I argue that there is another sense of ‘human dignity’ which does not render it synonymous with other, more well-entrenched bioethical concepts. This sense has been most fruitfully employed by Leon Kass and the President’s Council on Bioethics. In the first part of this paper, I explicate what Kass has in mind when he speaks of human dignity, viz. intangible, uniquely human goods. To speak of dignity in this sense is to claim that genuine human flourishing requires at least the following: moral virtue, appreciation of beauty, awareness of oneself as a unique individual, participation in human community, receptivity (or “respect for the given”), and personal agency.Once elucidated in this way, however, a number of problems present themselves. First, it is not obvious that these ideas are sufficiently precise to generate any real philosophical traction; one might wonder if appeals to human dignity will actually help us solve moral problems. Second, it is not clear that considerations based on human dignity will be adequately action-guiding. Third, it could be alleged that arguments based on human dignity are merely fallacious slippery slopes. I contend that all three of these problems are surmountable; ‘human dignity’ is a useful bioethical concept, though it does require something of a paradigm shift for contemporary applied ethicists.