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Is It Immoral To Be Prudent?

July 16, 2005
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Determining how to justly and effectively eliminate or limit unjust laws and conditions is a timeless dilemma in political life.  As centralized forms of political society have declined in number, and political power has been decentralized through the rise of democratic governments since the 1600s, more political leaders have faced this challenge, because more have had a role in political decision-making.  In seeking to overturn or limit unjust laws and conditions, what moral obligations do political leaders have in deciding which goals to seek and which means (strategies and tactics) to pursue? Must they exclusively pursue the perfectly just in law?  Are political leaders morally obliged to support only legislation, for example, that would completely prohibit slavery outright?  Could a political leader, as a means to the ultimate goal of abolition, propose legislation that would limit the evil by regulating it without prohibiting it outright?  What about those who assist political leaders: citizens, lawyers, activists, and aides?  What moral obligations did they have in deciding such strategic and tactical questions? The object of this paper is to discern those moral obligations within the particular context of modern democracy.                                                                        This paper will look at the tradition of prudential moral reasoning going back to Aristotle as well as the specific issue of cooperation in evil actions.   The central role of prudence in political governance was followed by Thomas Aquinas, and continued in the writings of John Calvin and Martin Luther. This dilemma is typically framed as a problem of avoiding participation or “cooperation” in evil actions or laws. But this incorporation of a concept applicable to personal moral probity may provide inadequate moral guidance to public officials without first considering the broader perspective of prudential moral reasoning and the contingencies of political decision-making.  Understanding that tradition gives a wider context to the specific question of cooperation. And understanding the prudential tradition is necessary to discern any differences between the individual’s capacity and responsibility to avoid cooperation and the public official’s. This tradition of prudential moral reasoning, focusing on the central element of prudence in political action, was incorporated into Christian ethics by Augustine in The City of God, with his doctrine of the Two Cities, the “first comprehensive statement on politics” by any church father.  In this tradition, prudence assumes moral ends, consistent with divine and natural law, and seeks wisdom in pursuing those ends, recognizing contingencies and obstacles to those ends. Prudential analysis recognizes the limits of what politics can achieve in the fallen world and emphasizes practical reasoning about contingencies and about the obstacles to achieving the greatest measure of justice (the good) possible in the fallen world.  Prudence recognizes the different spheres of responsibility of the individual and the statesman charged with the responsibility for public order and justice. The personal obligations (and abilities) of the individual to resist personal moral violations are different from the obligations (and abilities) of the statesmen to maintain public order and justice.

Keywords:
evangelium vitae, aristotelian ethics, prudential moral reasoning, imperfect legislation