Traditional criticisms of potentiality have centered on the idea that the scope of potentiality is impossibly broad so as to include genetic material as well. However, this conception implicitly misrepresents potentiality by reducing it to mere possibility. The object of his paper is to outline three distinctions that we can make that render this conflation untenable and suggest that we are better served to think of kinds of potentiality when referring to a relation to actualization. First, there is a clear distinction between process and event potentialities. The difference here is between objects which are currently in a state of actualizing versus those dependent upon some future event; focusing instead on the nature of an object’s actualization. Second, we regularly make distinctions between internal and external potentialities; potentialities that result from the combination or addition of external objects/materials (heat, cold, friction, etc.) versus those that result from inherent capacities. In contrast to the potential of tang powder to become a drink, an acorn’s actualization of an oak tree is not dependent upon an external force but the culmination of the potential inherent to the object. Third, we can make a distinction between singular potentialities and inherited potentialities. Where actuality precedes potentiality, a stronger relation exists than in cases where an object only possesses the singular potential to actualize the object. The paper then moves to a discussion of these distinctions categorize potential claims in reference to strong or weak kinds of potentiality. While weak potentiality may not denote any significant moral status, strong potentiality must be evaluated on the basis of the unique nature of the object in relation to its actualized form. The remainder of the paper considers objections to potentiality.