Recent debate among bioethicists and other specialists concerns the potential to enhance human beings’ physical or cognitive capacities. Between “transhumanists,” who argue for largely unrestricted enhancement of human capabilities, and “bioconservatives,” who warn against any non-therapeutic manipulation of humanity’s natural condition, lie those who support limited forms of enhancement for the sake of individual and collective human flourishing. Scholars representing these views also share a concern over the plight of human beings with various types of intellectual or physical disabilities, some of which may be ameliorable by enhancement interventions. I will address how valuing the enhancement of human capabilities may be reconciled with valuing the existence and phenomenological experiences of disabled human beings. I will begin by summarizing a “moderate” view allowing for certain forms of physical and cognitive enhancement that coheres with a classical understanding of human flourishing as formulated by Thomas Aquinas. I will then delineate a Thomistic view of the intrinsic dignity of persons with various types of physical or intellectual disabilities, distinguishing how we ought to value traits from how we ought to value the bearers of such traits, regardless of the extent to which one is capable of exhibiting them. I conclude that we may consistently promote certain enhancements aimed at facilitating one’s ability to actualize capacities conducive to human flourishing, while at the same time valuing the existence and flourishing of disabled persons in their given condition.