It is often stipulated in many a casual philosophical conversations that the uncertainty principle found within quantum mechanics provides the necessary freedom for the execution of unforced choice and therefore moral approbation and disapprobation. On the face of it, this seems to be a canard, for if our actions are truly the result of chance then we cannot be held accountable when an undetermined brain event instigates a good or bad set of affairs. Then, we appear to be led back to determinism; however it is unclear and seemingly equally farcical that we can be held accountable for our actions if our brain events are determined by preceding conditions. The aim of this paper will not be to determine whether or not our brains function on mechanistic principles or indeterminist ones. This is an ambitious task for the physicist and neuroscientist to tackle. Ultimately, this paper will seek to illuminate three inquiries; (1) Can a plausible definition of free will be articulated?, (2) Can the established notion of free will be brought into congruence with mechanistic conceptions of the universe and mind?, and (3) Is the discussed conception of free will commensurable with indeterminism?