The sanctity of human life is an important principle in most formulations of Christian bioethics. Many think that an important implication of this view is the prohibition of intentionally killing innocent human beings. Yet many also insist that vitalism is also to be avoided in that it can become a form of idolatry by valuing this life as the summum bonum or “highest good.” Therefore, an appropriate approach to Christian ethics should seek to avoid the extremes of euthanasia on one hand and vitalism on the other. And so, many Christian ethicists have affirmed that holding to a principle of the sanctity of human life does not entail vitalism. However, some critics argue that the sanctity of life principle is inconsistent in its application. One such example is that given by Helga Kuhse. She argues that those who hold to the principle are being inconsistent since “they affirm the equality of all human lives and yet base their arguments for a limited duty of life-preservation on implicit quality-of-life considerations.” (The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine, 26) One possible response to this particular challenge raised by Kuhse is to suggest that this sort of critique confuses the notions of what it is that makes human life valuable and what it means to flourish as human beings. To be sure, these are integrally related yet they are not coextensive. Moreover, one could argue, following John Keown, that theological ethicists who hold to the sanctity of human life principle can consistently employ properly qualified “quality of life” considerations with respect to the effectiveness of a given or proposed treatment at the end of life. This should be understood as altogether different from “Quality of Life” considerations that make judgments about the worthwhileness of the patient’s life, which would be inconsistent with a principle of the sanctity of human life. While human life should never be killed intentionally, there is no moral obligation on Christians, in light of the hope of glory, to continue merely to sustain biological life at the end of life when it is clear in view of our best available judgment, that the human being (who remains inherently valuable nonetheless) will not ever be able to exemplify other human values that contribute to human flourishing, theologically understood. I want to suggest that by distinguishing the basis of human value from human flourishing and correctly understanding how qualified “quality of life” considerations are applied in a medical context, Christian ethicists can consistently reject vitalism while maintaining a robust principle of the sanctity of human life.