In the recent book Death, Dying, and Organ Transplantation Robert Truog and Franklin Miller shine a bright light on end of life practices and organ procurement. They conclude that these practices are not supported by traditional medical ethics and argue that current end-of-life practices that involve removal of life-sustaining interventions are morally equivalent to euthanasia. They also state that both brain death and cardiac death criteria rely on legal fictions, and that patients are still living when their organs are harvested. As such they argue for jettisoning the dead-donor rule and propose reconstructing medical ethics at the end of life. Specifically they argue that under certain circumstances it is morally licit for physicians to end their patient’s life. This extends to organ procurement as well. If a patient intends to donate her organs, it should be within the boundaries of ethical practice to proceed with harvesting of organs prior to the patient’s death. I examine Truog and Miller’s arguments, find fault with their definitions, and point out that while they state that “traditional ethics reflect a moral bias against killing” that they harbor moral biases of their own. Their arguments are very tight and I explore whether or not we can escape their logic.