A perennial problem in nearly all bioethical debates concerns equivocation in terminology. Perhaps no term has proven more susceptible than the use of ‘dignity,’ which has shown itself to be frustratingly amenable to radically diverse interpretations. For instance, Christian ethicists commonly appeal to human dignity to condemn all forms of euthanasia, while their pro-euthanasia counterparts assert that dignity affords each individual the right to have life and death on one’s own terms—witness the Swiss assisted suicide organization Dignitas. While some scholars like Mary Ann Glendon continue to insist that ‘dignity’ is a term worth keeping, though it remains notoriously resistant to precise definition, others like Ruth Macklin have declared ‘dignity’ as an “utterly useless concept,” reducible to a basic respect for patient autonomy. I will argue that the equivocation surrounding the notion of dignity stems not from a simple lack of specificity or precision, but from the incommensurability of the competing worldviews from which the term ‘dignity’ gains intelligibility and meaning. Indeed, the more profound question concerns the underlying competing metanarratives that make such a term intelligible. Hence, in order to see whether this term is indeed worth salvaging, the ultimate intelligibility of a term must be situated within a meta-narrative that renders some account of the human creature, including an understanding of human flourishing. Drawing upon the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Gilbert Meilaender, and Allen Verhey, I will investigate how the term ‘dignity’ functions within the two metanarratives known as the ‘baconian myth’ and the ‘myth of the project of liberal society.’ I will then examine the common assumptions behind the use of dignity by Christian ethicists, inferring from its use the implicit worldview or metanarrative, suggesting that there may be ‘weak spots’ in the way Christian ethicists invoke the concept of dignity that betray an operative worldview that may be at odds with a more theologically robust Christian metanarrative. Finally, I will sketch outlines of how a robustly Christian understanding of dignity might reshape some of the ways Christians speak of having children, one in particular which rightly resists trends towards commodification.