Pain is neither intrinsically good or bad, but a mechanism that is sometimes necessary and sometimes debilitating. In the case of very young children pain pushes development, yet too much is incapacitating (perhaps developmentally fixating the child and certainly creating a physiological propensity toward chronic pain). The clinical achievement of debilitating-pain-reduction in the biologically normal child is less making an improvement than ‘negating the negative.’ Temporary pain treatment for neonates and post-neonates is generally accepted, but if the range of pain experienced by the very young could be permanently reduced using biotechnology, should it be? In the late modern West, there is considerable debate on the moral and biological significance of pain. Alteration of the experience of pain in the body, if permanent and inheritable, is often deemed genetic ‘enhancement’ or ‘positive eugenics’ (that is ‘improving’ on the normal using an ideal). Or sometimes, it is called ‘therapeutic’ (treatment to ‘return’ to the normal). Another moral category exists: the ‘negation of the negative’ in the normal person, which might include efforts to permanently manage pain in the very young. The authors consider whether changing the normal biological experience of pain in the very young (especially when induced by late modern medical treatments) could be culturally, developmentally, and/or morally normative. The following specific questions are raised: Should pain experience be permanently minimized, if possible, in the very young?··What is the authority of parents to change not only the immediate experience of those who cannot speak for themselves, but ·· on-going experiences (and, if germline alteration, all future generations)?What specific Christian framing should be brought to bear, especially given biblical language about pain?··How should Christians respond to ‘abolitionist’ bioethicists using utilitarianism or hedonism and claiming that pain should be ·· eliminated to the greatest extent possible?