Prenatal diagnostics is currently a controversial field of genetics from an ethical perspective. While it allows for a more precise diagnosis of the fetus, thus preparing parents for any necessity of specialized perinatal or postnatal care, in not a few cases it leads to the abortion of a fetus diagnosed with congenital defects or concrete genetic syndromes. Thus prenatal diagnostics has been identified by some of its critics as intrinsically eugenic. In Poland the process of prenatal diagnostics is usually accompanied by genetic counselling, during which the patient is informed on the indications for prenatal diagnosis, the diagnostic scope and limits of non-invasive and invasive procedures, risk of complications involved in invasive tests. The clinical geneticist afterwards interprets the results of diagnostic tests, describes the possible clinical consequences and prognosis of identified anomalies, as well as further options after the diagnosis. As in all forms of genetic counselling, non-directiveness—avoidance of imperatives or direct suggestions towards specific options—is an ethical requisite in these conversations, as it rightly defends the autonomy of the patients in deciding on options which affect them directly, with the clear consciousness of risks that they themselves are to bear. Given the specificity of the matter of counselling in prenatal diagnostics—the subject of diagnosis is the yet unborn fetus, and the decisions made thereafter consequently and essentially affect its existence—there is a necessity for the requisite of non-directiveness to be considered in a proper context. Prenatal diagnostics is a specific medical field of serious moral implications; genetic counselling in prenatal diagnostics, therefore, cannot evade ethical reflection. Non-directiveness as an ethical requisite does not mean moral neutrality. If genetic counselling is meant to be an authentic aspect of medical care, non-directiveness has to be specifically responsible non-directiveness, founded on the conviction that the content and form of counselling does affect the patients’ decision-making and thus demands from the geneticist a minimum of ethical reflection. Responsible non-directiveness combines respect for the patients’ autonomy with well-informed counsel, providing options far from eugenic principles, involving perinatal and postnatal care in case of diagnosed congenital disease. This is only one of the many aspects of the ethics of genetic counselling yet to be reflected upon, developed and—more importantly—practiced.