Reductionism is usually taken for granted in many areas of science, neuroscience being no exception. It is often assumed as scientific orthodoxy that human behavior can be reduced to “what the brain does” without recourse to a consideration of cognition. While many philosophers and ethicists may seek to reduce or eliminate the concept of mind, other philosophers and ethicists have continually pointed out the logical inconsistencies of this approach. On the one hand there is the concept of the human mind and the human organism as person: Working within this realm we judge the correctness of actions and debate issues such as neurological and mental health ethics. On the other hand there is the realm of the human brain as organ, a world of neurochemicals, synapses, and gene expression. Via a discussion of efficient and final causes in Aristotelian philosophy, this presentation seeks to argue that the understanding of human beings as rational and social creatures has guided and should continue to guide our approach to the care of treatment of the mentally ill—observations concerning rational behavior and cognition, by necessity, have provided the benchmarks with which clinicians evaluate the effectiveness of somatic/pharmacological or psychological/behavioral interventions: Eliminative reductionism is inappropriate in this area. In approaching issues related to the relationship between human cognitive functioning and neural functioning, the distinction between capacity and vehicle will be utilized. Those working with the mentally ill or the neurologically compromised need to know both the efficient causes—the vehicles of certain capacities—and the role of the capacities themselves and how they relate to possible final causes in giving explanations for behavior. The use of “cosmetic” pharmacotherapy or neurological manipulations be more ethically problematic (or debatable) in comparison to those treatment that explicitly seek to restore the vehicles for normal human capacities.