In light of the Jahi McMath case, there have been calls to replicate the New Jersey statute that permits one to conscientiously object to a death declaration made on the basis of “whole-brain” neurological criteria. I oppose these calls for two reasons. The first is that the exemption is too strong in that it goes beyond the purpose of protecting religious liberty to protecting religious diversity; weaker “reasonable accommodation” laws or policies can and should be used to protect religious liberty. Protection from being forced to act against one’s will is what conscientious objection policies are supposed to do in American law; they are not designed to protect and promote religious belief. Religious exemption based on the protection of conscience is therefore a mistake, because no one is forced to act against their will by virtue of receiving a brain death declaration. Rather, the objection is based on disagreement with the government’s understanding of human death. The second is that (1) our statutes for determining death are neutral with respect to religious teaching, (2) they advance significant government interests, and (3) substantially promote those interests, and therefore, should not be brought under the “strict scrutiny” test outlined in Sherbert v. Verner. I then end by offering a suggestion for how providers can move forward in sensitivity through policies of reasonable accommodation to those who disagree with a brain-death declaration in a way that respects religious liberty.