While not explicitly stated but philosophically implied, the conceptualization of morality by some proponents of moral bioenhancement require particular epistemological commitments and neuroessentialist assumptions (that is, “we are the brain”). This presentation examines these assumptions, shows why such premises are problematic for the development of a sophisticated framework of morality at the intersection of neuroscience and moral philosophy, and why these premises cannot support the possibility of moral enhancement (moral in the strong sense of the word which encompasses moral capacity, or the disposition to respond morally, and moral content or particular beliefs and ideas about notions of the good, the right, and the just). First, I provide conceptual clarity on key concepts in the moral enhancement debate, including the distinction between psychopharmacology and neurotechnologies as means to cognitive enhancement, the meaning of moral enhancement, and the crucial distinction between moral capacity and moral content. Second, I critique neuroessentialism pointing out that there is a danger to reduce human behavior to neurobiology and the potential to misconceptualize human moral psychology. Third, I expand my critique of neuroessentialism, particularly with regard to the concept of moral agency, and offer a viable alternative based on a theological understanding of social practices.